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In devising and implementing industrial policies, less developed countries
(LDCs) often rely on foreign investors to provide the necessary financing and
technology.' The challenge LDCs face is to devise a regulatory scheme which
actually promotes what domestic policy makers believe to be appropriate indus-
trialization. An open and unrestricted invitation of foreign investment, while
increasing the amount of foreign capital in an economy, may lead to the develop-
ment of only non-industrial sectors or some other form of unbalanced develop-
ment.2 Similarly, excessive regulation risks discouraging altogether the
investment of foreign capital and technology needed to execute developing coun-
tries' industrial projects. Consequently, developing countries strive to control,
without unnecessarily discouraging, foreign investment through laws that ulti-
mately promote industrialization in targeted sectors of the economy. LDCs strike
this balance in economic development policies through foreign investment laws
that both attract and restrict foreign capital. 3
* Jane E. Cross is a member of the class of 1985, University of Michigan Law School.
I. G. REUBER, PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPMENT 239-40 (1973); cf. Akinsanya,
Host Government's Response to Foreign Economic Control: The Experience of Selected African
Countries, 30 INT'L & CoM. L.Q. 769, 770 (1981) ("In an underdeveloped country, the function of
investments is to push those factors that would lead to economic progress."); Soberanis, The Chang-
ing Legal Climate for Multinational Investment in Developing Countries, 10 LAW. AM. 365, 367
(1978) (identifying Mexico's foreign investment law as an example of the trend in LDCs toward
controlling the activities of multinationals in a way that paroles national objectives).
2. See G. REUBER, supra note 1, at 20-21; cf. Kalsi, Encouragement of Private Foreign Investment
in the Developing Country: Provisions in the Laws of Kenya, 6 INT'L LAW. 576, 578 (1972) (develop-
ing countries are suspicious of foreign investment); Note, Host Countries' Attitude Toward Foreign
Investment, 3 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 243 (1977) (discussing the need to control or limit foreign
investment).
3. See G. REUBER, supra note I, at 248-50. According to Reuber:
In addition to general economic policies ... governments in most LDCs have also adopted
a wide range of policies relating specifically to private foreign investment: some designed to
attract such investment; and some designed to regulate it. In many cases these policies have
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The regulatory schemes embodied in foreign investment laws of developing
countries such as Argentina, Mexico, and Nigeria reveal a current tendency to
relax restrictions on foreign investment in a paramount effort to promote indus-
trialization. In the early 1970s, these three countries adopted restrictive foreign
investment laws designed to monitor and regulate foreign investment. As part of
their efforts to promote industrial growth, however, each has since liberalized the
restrictions of its investment law to permit more foreign capital, especially in
areas where domestic capital is inadequate or unavailable.
After repealing a highly restrictive foreign investment law, Argentina enacted
a relatively liberal law, which imposes only procedural constraints on foreign
investors. Both Mexico and Nigeria, on the other hand, have retained their
restrictive foreign investment laws, which limit foreign participation according to
the type of investment involved. The Mexican Government, however, now per-
mits the administrative modification of general rules and grants exemptions from
its restrictions on a case-by-case basis. While Nigeria's law does not give the
government express power to authorize exemptions, the Nigerian Government
has been able to modify it slightly and consequently permit more foreign invest-
ment by reclassifying enterprises. More importantly, foreign investors often vio-
late Nigeria's law without sanction, thereby effectively relaxing the law's
restrictions.
Each of these three countries has tried to liberalize its foreign investment laws
while retaining some measure of control over investment actually undertaken. By
balancing the two goals of liberalizing restrictions on and mantaining control
over foreign investment, these three developing countries seek to attract the
foreign capital necessary for industrialization.
Rather than extensively analyzing the various laws of Argentina, Mexico, and
Nigeria that are specifically designed to encourage foreign investment, this note
endeavors to explain how the laws of these countries that have as the primary
function the monitoring and restricting of foreign investment activity are able to
refrain from severely discouraging the foreign investment needed to promote
industrialization. The tendency of LDCs to liberalize their restrictive foreign
investment laws over the last few years demonstrates the growing importance of
minimizing the adverse impact of legal constraints on foreign capital investment.
been mutually offsetting .... Much of the legislation that now exists on local equity par-
ticipation ... and the like, probably does more harm than good. ...
Most LDCs wishing to attract foreign investment in many capital intensive modem indus-
tries and to increase their export sales of products produced in such industries ... need to
think in terms of ... foreign markets .... [lI]t may also be necessary to accept some of the
characteristics typical of such investments-such as relatively high levels of foreign
ownership, less local participation and integration and a relatively weaker bargaining position
vis-a-vis the foreign investor.
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I. ARGENTINA
The recent history and current form of the Argentine Foreign Investment Act
4
(the Act) exemplify the trend in developing countries toward adopting less
rigorous restrictions on foreign investment. In the early seventies, the Argentine
Government, then suffused with the nationalistic spirit of the Andean Foreign
Investment Code,' adopted the inflexible and restrictive Law No. 20.557.6 The
rigid requirements and prohibitions of that law unintentionally induced a drastic
decline in the level of new foreign investment in Argentina, thus exacerbating
existing economic difficulties.
7
As part of a thorough revision of economic policies in 1976, Argentina re-
pealed Law No. 20.5578 and adopted Law No. 21.3829 which, as amended in
1980, 10 is the current Foreign Investment Act. The Act ended Argentina's experi-
ment with nationalistic policies and reflects its willingness to encourage foreign
4. Ley 21.382, 36-C Anales de Legislacion Argentina [Anales] 2071 (1976), as amended by Ley
22.208, 40-B Anales 1024 (1980) (repealing Ley 20.557, 33-D Anales 3670 (1973); Ley 20.575, 34-
A Anales 16 (1974); Ley 21.037, 35-C Anales 2717 (1975)) (Law of Foreign Investment).
5. Andean Foreign Investment Code, translated in 16 I.L.M. 138 (1977) (codified text). The Code
was originally adopted in 1970. It was amended in 1971, 1973, and 1976. See 16 I.L.M. 138.
6. Ley 20.557, 33-D Anales 3670 (1973), repealed by Ley 21.382, supra note 4 (Law of Invest-
ment of Foreign Capital), translated in 12 I.L.M. 1491 (1973). The Argentine Government adopted
Ley 20.557 in 1973 to replace the then existing inadequate foreign investment scheme. The Govern-
ment's intent in passing the law was to control foreign investment to safeguard the economy from
adverse effects of foreign capital. To that end, the law promoted greater use of Argentine manpower,
technology, services, goods, and institutions, and encouraged those economic activities that contrib-
uted to Argentina's industrial development. To the extent that Ley 20.557 safeguards the economy
from the dominance of foreign capital, it incorporates the fundamental principles of the Andean
Code. See generally J. BRUZZON, RADICACIONES DE CAPITALES EXTRANJERO. Ley 20.557 (1974);
R. SANGUINETTI, A STATEMENT OF THE LAWS OF ARGENTINA IN MATTERS AFFECTING BUSINESS
40-42 (4th ed. 1975) (in Spanish) (translated, edited, and published by the General Secretariet,
Organization of American States).
7. As a result of the implementation of Ley 20.557, "the flow of new foreign investments was no
more than a trickle as international confidence ... dwindled to zero." COORDINATION AND ECO-
NOMIC PLANNING SECRETARIAT, MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, ECONOMIC INFORMATION ON ARGENTINA
No. 101, at 44 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC INFORMATION No. 101]. This situation helped
put Argentina near bankruptcy due to the very real danger of default on its foreign payments in March
1976. Id. at 44-46.
8. As a result of the decline in foreign investment, Ley 20.557 became a target of reform for the
Argentine Government. The change in policy was also attributable to the overthrow of the Peron
Government. See Studwell & Cabanellas, The New Argentine Foreign Investment Law: An Analysis
and Commentary, I HASTINGS INT'L & COMF. L. REV. 37, 40 (1977); see also J. BRuZZON, supra
note 6, at 12.
9. See supra note 4.
10. Ley 22.208, 40-B Anales 1024 (1980) (Foreign Investment). Ley 22.208 modified Ley 21.382
by setting up a simpler foreign investment procedure and by eliminating provisions which could
reduce the inflow of foreign capital. Dahl, Argentina's System of Foreign Investments, 6 FORDHAM
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investment." The Act does not, however, eliminate all regulation of foreign
investment. Rather, its rules embody Argentina's new policy of cautious encour-
agement of foreign investment to stimulate industrial development. '2 Thus, while
maintaining some government regulation, the Act permits the foreign investment
needed to supply adequate capital for Argentina's industrial development. 13
The Act's procedures subject foreign investment activities' 4 to varying levels
of government scrutiny depending on the activity's potential political and eco-
nomic impact. Foreign participation in activities deemed to be of substantial
economic and political importance to Argentina requires prior government ap-
proval, whereas less significant investments need no permission. By subjecting
only certain types of investment to government approval, the Argentine Govern-
ment attempts to retain effective regulation of foreign capital while still avoiding
excessive controls. 15
Most of the activities once considered politically or economically sensitive and
consequently closed to foreign investment under the previous Law No. 20.55716
now require approval at the executive level. 17 For example, instead of prohibiting
INT'L L.J. 33, 47 n.66 (1982); see also COORDINATION AND ECONOMIC PLANNING SECRETARIAT,
MINISTRY OF THE ECONOMY, ECONOMIC INFORMATION ARGENTINA No. 108, at 14 (1979).
II. The government's revision of the foreign investment law was an integral part of a national
legislative framework designed to reduce restrictions capable of stagnating industry and discouraging
investment. ECONOMIC INFORMATION No. 101, supra note 7, at 45-46.
12. See Studwell & Cabanellas, supra note 8, at 40.
13. The Argentine Government seeks to supervise and guide industrial development for the country
so as to reach its full potential based on the expansion of the already developed industrial sector and
aided by an increase in broad based foreign investments. ECONOMIC INFORMATION No. 101, supra
note 7, at 46-47.
14. The Act describes foreign investment as any investment belonging to a foreigner that involves
industrial, mining, agricultural, financial, commercial, or service activities, or other activities related
to the production or exchange of services or goods, or the acquisitions of shares in an existing local
company. Ley 21.382, supra note 4, at art. 2. It provides that these foreign investments may be made
freely, and their accessories, profits or capital in the national currency of the foreign investor,
capitalization of foreign credits in freely convertible currency, intangible assets, or other types of
contributions accepted by the Authority of Application, or contemplated under special or promotional
programs. Id. at art. 3. This definition does not include loans. Decreto 103, art. 4, 41-A Anales 261
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Decreto 103/81].
15. Dahl, supra note 10, at 60.
16. Article 6 of Ley 20.557 prohibited foreign investment that would limit export possibilities,
interfere with the jurisdiction of Argentina's courts, result in the foreign acquisition of ownership and
control in a local company of Argentine capital engaged in the field of manufacturing, or involve
activities related to national defense or certain activities reserved to government entities or Argentine
companies. Ley 20.557, supra note 6, at art. 6.
17. Executive Power for the purposes of Argentine foreign investment law refers to the person or
persons occupying the Executive office which governs Argentina.
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foreign participation in defense,18 communications, 19 public services, 20 financial
entities, 21 and the energy and extractive industries,22 the Foreign Investment Act
permits such investments after the Executive Power has granted approval. 23 For-
eign acquisitions of shares, or of businesses, and contributions of capital that
18. National security and defense industries encompass investment in naval and aeronautic con-
struction, space research and development, atomic energy, and the production of materials and
equipment directly related to the specific activities executed by the armed forces for purposes of
national defense. The Minister of Defense determines whether the proposed foreign investment falls
within this sector. Decreto 103/81, supra note 14, at art. 16.
19. Investment activities in communications are politically sensitive in Argentina because a for-
eigner controlling such industries could exercise a powerful influence on public opinion. J. BRUZZON,
supra note 6, at 70.
20. Public services have traditionally been state controlled. The Argentine Legislature decided to
continue that practice by delegating such investments to executive approval. Id. at 67.
21. The definition of financial entity is determined by the law concerning financial entities. Decreto
103/81, supra note 14, at art. 19.
22. Energy and extractive industries were not closed to foreign investment under Ley 20.557. J.
BRUZZON, supra note 6, at 71. Energy and extractive industries refer to the exploration and exploita-
tion of petroleum, natural gas and coal. The category also includes the generation, transformation,
and distribution of electricity as a public service designed to meet the general needs of the users in a
given community as authorized by the government. Decreto 103/81, supra note 14, at art. 18.
23. See Ley 21.382, supra note 4, at art. 4, as amended by Ley 22.208, supra note 10, at art. 2. In
addition to the investments described in the text, under the new scheme the Executive Power must
approve the following investments which were not prohibited under Ley 20.557: foreign investments
worth over $20 million US, id. at art. 4(4); investments made by a foreign state or legal entity of
public law, id. at art. 4(5); and investments requesting special or promotional benefits which must be
granted by the Executive Power as a prerequisite of the proposed investment. Id. at art. 4(6). The $20
million limit of article 4(4) is calculated for each receiving company, regarding foreign investors. The
ceiling is calculated based on all capital investments, except reinvestments of profits and new invest-
ments in freely convertible currency, made in the receiving company during the year after it reports
its foreign investment activities to the Subsecretary of the Economy. Thereafter, the amount of
investment is computed every three years. The investment requires subsequent Executive approval
when the previously approved amount increases by more than $5 million within three years. Decreto
103/81, supra note 14, at art. 27.
When a promotional or beneficial program is a condition of the investment, approval of the
program is granted along with the approval of the investment. Id. at art. 26. For the sake of
consistency, Executive approval is necessary when the foreign investment requests special and pro-
motional benefits which the Executive Power has the authority to grant. Executive intervention in
these areas facilitates the approval of and expedites the execution of projects which are considered
beneficial to the country. COORDINATION AND ECONOMIC PLANNING SECRETARIAT, MINISTRY OF
ECONOMY, ECONOMIC INFORMATION ON ARGENTINA No. 64, at 4 (1976) (reprinting official com-
ments and Ley 21.382) [hereinafter cited as OFFICIAL COMMENTS]; see also Dahl, supra note 10, at
48. In addition, Executive approval is necessary for investments falling under Article 4(5) because the
involvement of a foreign sovereign implicates the conduct of Argentina's foreign relations which is
within the Executive's competence. OFFICIAL COMMENTS, supra, at 4. Approvals of proposed
foreign investment in these areas are granted by the Executive Power when, in its judgment, the
investment will make a positive contribution to the economic development of Argentina. See Ley
21.382, supra note 4, at art. 8.
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would denationalize Argentine companies were also once entirely prohibited. 2 4
Under the Act, these investments are subject to Executive scrutiny only when the
net worth or value of the denationalized company exceeds U.S. $10 million.25
Foreign investments likely to have only a moderate impact on the Argentine
economy require the approval of the Act's implementing authority, Subsecretarfa
de Economfa (the Authority),2 6 whereas the remaining investments require no
government approval. 27 The Authority must approve investments which, based
on their total dollar amount or their denationalizing potential, are too important to
leave unregulated but are too numerous for the Executive to monitor. For exam-
ple, all acquisitions of shares or businesses owned by Argentine investors, for-
24. Denationalization of a local company of Argentine capital occurs when investors, domiciled
abroad, directly or indirectly acquire majority ownership or control of a company previously major-
ity-owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by investors domiciled in Argentina. A company
which is majority-owned or controlled by foreigners is called a "local company of foreign capital."
Ley 21.382, supra note 4, at art. 2(3). Similarly, a corporation which is majority-owned or controlled
by domestic investors is a "local company of national capital." Id. at art. 2(4). Majority ownership
occurs under Argentine law when individuals or legal entities directly or indirectly own shares or
equity participations representing one half or more of the total votes corresponding to the outstanding
shares or existing participations. Decreto 103/81, supra note 14, at art. 2. In addition, if the votes of
foreign investors present at meetings of shareholders or partners outnumber the votes belonging to the
other shareholders or partners for a period of three years or during the majority of the meetings for a
period of five years, the implementing authority, see infra note 26, after careful evaluation, may
consider that company a local company of foreign capital. A transfer of ownership or control from
Argentine to foreign investors may also occur when foreign investors acquire majority ownership
through the purchase of existing shares of the corporation or through capital contributions to the
company. See Ley 21.382, supra note 4, at art. 4(2), 4(3), as amended by Ley 22.208, supra note 10,
at art. 2.
25. The net worth of a business is based on the net worth stated in the last annual balance sheet
prior to the presentation of the proposed investment. The stated net worth is converted into U.S.
dollars based on the exchange rate applicable on the closing date of the balance sheet used. Decreto
103/81, supra note 14, at art. 20. The value of an acquired business is the price quoted on the
documents of the acquisitions, computed on the date of the acquisition. The value in U.S. dollars will
be computed based on the exchange rate applicable on the date of documentation. Id. at art. 21.
26. Decreto 313/82 names the Subsecretary of the Economy of the Ministry of the Economy as the
Implementing Authority for Ley 21.382. Decreto 313, art. 1, [1982] El Derecho Legislacion Argen-
tina 306-07. The implementing authority (the Authority) evaluates all foreign investment requiring
government approval. In those instances where the Executive Power must ultimately approve the
investment, the Authority reports its evaluation to the Executive. The Authority bases its evaluation of
a proposed foreign investment on criteria listed in the implementing regulation, Decreto 103/81. The
listed criteria are similar to the requirements imposed on all new investments by the Authority under
the now repealed Ley 20.557. The Authority may now exercise greater discretion in applying these
criteria since it may recommend a proposed investment when that investment specifically satisfies one
or more of the listed criteria or generally will benefit Argentina's economic development. Previously,
under Ley 20.557, the Authority could approve a proposed investment only if it met a number of
listed criteria. Ley 20.557, supra note 6, at art. 5.
27. For a discussion of investments not requiring government approval, see infra notes 31-40 and
accompanying text.
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eign investments valued between U.S. $5 and $20 million, 2 and capital
contributions which denationalize companies worth less than $10 million29 are
subject to the Authority's approval. In addition, all foreign investments not
requiring Executive approval, not automatically registered under Article 5, and
not requiring approval under Article 4 must obtain the Authority's consent. 30
As provided in Article 5 of the Act, no prior consent is necessary for reinvest-
ment of profits 3 or for investment in freely convertible currency3 2 in companies
with registered foreign capital. 3 3 Capital contributions of less than U.S. $5
million made in freely convertible currency to existing enterprises without for-
eign capital also do not require government approval. 3 4 Foreign investment meet-
ing the conditions of Article 5 is automatically registered and, therefore, not
subject to government scrutiny, 35 unless it denationalizes a local company of
Argentine capital. 36 By dropping the prior approval required for new foreign
investments under Law No. 20.557, 31 the Argentine Government facilitated the
28. See supra note 25 for the method of computing value.
29. See supra note 25 for the method of calculating net worth.
30. See Ley 21.382, supra note 4, at art. 6, as amended by Ley 22.208, supra note 10, at art. 4.
31. Only those reinvestments of profit indicated on the closing balance sheet for each fiscal year
qualify. Decreto 103/81, supra note 14, at art. 7. A reinvestment of profits is the retention of profits in
a company to increase its capital. When a company decides to invest the profits made in one branch in
another branch, it must credit the profit to be invested to a special account and inform the Registry of
Foreign Investment. Id. at art. 30. Reinvestments of profit in a company with registered capital are
permitted even when they are made in those sectors subject to Executive approval. Ley 21.382, supra
note 4, at art. 4(1), as amended by Ley 22.208, supra note 10, at art. 2.
32. A foreign investor may invest in the currency of his country of origin, or with the approval of
the Authority on the advice of the Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina, the currency of another
country. Once an investor chooses to invest in a particular currency, he cannot change without the
consent of the Authority as advised by the Central Bank. Decreto 103/81, supra note 14, at art. 62. In
any one year, investments in freely convertible foreign currency must not exceed 30 percent of the
registered foreign capital in the receiving company. Ley 21.382, supra note 4, at art. 5, as amended
by Ley 22.208, supra note 10, at art. 3.
33. Registered foreign capital refers to capital registered after receiving the approval of the
Executive power or of the Authority. Both reinvestment of profit and new investment in freely
convertible currency must be made in activities for which the Executive's or Authority's approval was
originally received or in activities that the company was engaged when 21.382 went into force. See
Ley 21.382, supra note 4, at art. 5, as amended by Ley 22.208, supra note 10, at art. 3.
34. Ley 21.382, supra note 4, at art. 5, as amended by Ley 22.208, supra note 10, at art 3.
35. If, however, the foreign investor is a foreign state or public entity, or requests special or
promotional benefits, Executive approval is required under Article 4. M. SLAME, INVERSIONES
EXTRANJERAS: REGIMEN LEGAL Y ANTECEDENTES JURIDICOS Y ECONOMICO 64 (1981). Automatic
approval does not eliminate the requirement of registration of certain investments as mandated by
other laws. Studwell & Cabanellas, supra note 8, at 54.
36. Ley 21.382, supra note 4, at art. 5, as amended by Ley 22.208, supra note 10, at art. 3; see
supra note 24.
37. See Ley 20.557, supra note 6, at art. 4.
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limited expansion of existing businesses through the investment of foreign cap-
ital. 38
Finally, Article 6 provides that government approval is not necessary when a
foreigner purchases limited amounts of local company stock listed on the Argen-
tine stock exchange. 39 A foreign investor, however, cannot register these pur-
chases of stock, and consequently loses the right to remit profits and repatriate
capital during periods of exchange control. 4
II. MEXICO
In contrast to the procedural constraints on foreign investment in Argentina,
foreign investment law in Mexico sets forth quantitative restrictions requiring
majority Mexican ownership in joint ventures with foreign investors. These
restrictions are subject to certain exemptions which the Mexican Government
generally grants in industries that have been unable to obtain the necessary
financing or technology from local sources. The government restricts foreign
investment only in industries in which local firms can compete effectively with-
out the assistance of foreign capital. 4
To control foreign capital, the Law on the Promotion of Mexican Investment
and the Regulation of Foreign Investment (EI.L.)42 limits investment in certain
industries to the government or Mexican nationals and restricts foreign ownership
in other industries to 49 percent. 43 Enacted in 1973, the EI.L. codified existing
laws, decrees, administrative rulings, policies, and unwritten procedures ex-
ecuted primarily by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Industry
and Commerce."4 The FI.L. represents a departure from Mexico's previous
38. See OFFICIAL COMMENTS, supra note 23, at 4.
39. The total holding of shares per foreign investor must not exceed $2 million US or two percent
of the capital for each receiving company. The total holdings of shares purchased by all foreign
investors under Article 7 must not exceed 20 percent of the capital of the receiving company. Ley
21.382, supra note 4, at art. 6, as amended by Ley 22.208, supra note 10, at art. 5.
40. [AII foreign investors, whether they have a registered investment or not, may freely repatriate
capital and remit profits without limit. However, if the Executive should place overall foreign ex-
change limitations on these remittances, only the foreign investors will enjoy the right to repatriate
capital and remit profits, while the right of the non-registered investor ceases. Bomchil, The New
Foreign Investment Regime in Argentina, 7 BROOKLYN J. INT'L LAW 27, 35 (1981) (citations omitted)
(discussing Articles 12 and 13 of Ley 21.382, as amended).
41. President Echeverria declared that "[f]oreign investment ought not to displace Mexican capital,
but rather ought to complement it, associating with it when this is useful." Hollman, Mexican
Restrictions on Foreign Investments and Technology, PRAc. LAw., Feb. 1974, at 55, 56; see generally
Wionczek, Mexican Nationalism, Foreign Private Investment, and Problems of Technology Transfer,
in PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD 191 (P. Ady ed. 1971).
42. Law on the Promotion of Mexican Investment and the Regulation of Foreign Investment,
translated in 12 I.L.M. 643 (1973) [hereinafter cited as FI.L.].
43. Id. at art. 5, 12 L.L.M. at 644.
44. Hyde & Ramirez de la Corte, Mexico's New Transfer of Technology and Foreign Investment
Laws-To What Extent Have the Rules Changed?, 10 INT'L LAW. 231, 238-39 (1976).
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foreign investment practices in that it limits foreigners' ability to control either
the management or the equity of Mexican businesses. 45 The same law establishes
the National Commission on Foreign Investment (the Commission). 46 The Com-
mission has the authority to grant exemptions from the foreign equity participa-
tion restriction.
47
The FI.L. expressly states the criteria that the Commission is to use in deter-
mining whether to grant an exemption. 4 During the past decade, the Commis-
45. F.I.L., supra note 42, at art. 5, 12 I.L.M. at 644. Article 5 states that "[t]he participation of
foreign investment in the administration of the business may not exceed its participation in the
capital." Id. Article 4 of the FI.L. declares that "[tihe following activities are reserved exclusively
for the State: a) Petroleum and other hydrocarbons, b) Basic petrochemicals, c) Exploitation of
radioactive minerals and the generation of nuclear energy, d) Mining in cases to which the relative law
refers, e) Electricity, f) Railroads, g) Telegraphic and wireless communications, and h) Other ac-
tivities established in specific laws." Id. at art. 4, 12 I.L.M. at 644. Article 4 further reserves the
following activities for Mexican companies: "a) Radio and television, b) Urban and interurban
automotive transportation and federal highways transport, c) Domestic air and maritime transporta-
tion, d) Exploitation of forestry resources, e) Gas distribution, and f) Others established in specific
laws, or regulations issued by the Federal Executive." Id. The restrictions on foreign investment
include limiting foreign capital to 34 percent in companies engaging in the exploitation and the use of
minerals and to 40 percent for companies engaging in the use of substances subject to ordinary
concessions. Id. at art. 5, 12 I.L.M. at 644. Likewise, foreign equity in the secondary petrochemical
industries is limited to 40 percent. Id.
46. The Commission is composed of the President and the secretaries of the Interior, Foreign
Affairs, Finance and Public Credit, National Patrimony, Industry and Commerce, and Labor and
Social Welfare. Id. at art. 11, 12 I.L.M. at 645.
47. Id. at art. 12, 12. I.L.M. at 645-46.
48. Article 13 provides:
In order to determine the convenience of authorizing foreign investment and in order to
establish the percentages and conditions by which it shall be ruled, the Commission shall take
into consideration the following criteria and characteristics of the investments:
I. That is [sic] should be complementary to national investment;
11. That it should not displace national business enterprises that are operating satisfactorily,
and that it should not enter fields that are adequately covered by them;
111. Its positive effects on the balance of payments and, especially, on the increase of Mexican
exports;
IV. Its effects on employment, taking into account job opportunities created and wages payed
[sic];
V. The employment and training of Mexican technicians and management personnel;
VI. The incorporation of domestic inputs and components in the manufacture of its products;
VII. The extent to which it finances its operations with resources from abroad;
VIII. The diversification of sources of investment and the need to foster Latin American
regional and subregional integration;
IX. Its contribution to the development of the relatively less economically developed zones or
regions;
X. That it should not enjoy monopolistic positions in the domestic market;
XI. The capital structure of the branch of economic activity involved;
XII. Its supply of technology and its contribution to technological research and development
in the country;
XIII. Its effects on price levels and production quality;
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sion granted hundreds of individual exemptions and has adopted 17 general
resolutions which relax and clarify the EI.L.'s ownership requirements. 49 This
exercise of the Commission's authority effectively liberalized the foreign equity
XIV. That it respect the country's social and cultural values;
XV. The importance of the activity in question in the context of the country's economy;
XVI. The extent to which the foreign investor is identified with the country's interests and his
involvement with foreign centers of economic decision;
XVII. In general, the extent to which it complies with, and contributes to, the achievement of
national development policy objectives.
Id. at art. 13, 12 I.L.M. at 646-47.
49. The general resolutions are reprinted in LEYES Y CODIGOS DE MEXICO, LEGISLACION SOBRE
PROPIEDAD INDUSTRIAL, TRANSFERENCIA DE TECHNOLOGIA E INVERSIONES EXTRANJERAS (7th ed.
1982) [hereinafter cited as LEYES]. General Resolution No. 1 provides an exception to the FI.L for
the purpose of establishing "maquiladores" (in-bond plants). In these border factories, foreigners are
permitted to acquire up to 100 percent ownership in all manufacturing industries except textiles.
LEYES, supra, at 407-09. General Resolution No. 2 permits an increase in capital or shares of
existing enterprises which maintain the same ratio between the nominal value of Mexican and foreign
investment and capital stock existing in that company when the FI.L. was enacted. LEYES, supra, at
409-10.
General Resolution No. 3 permits foreigners to purchase up to five percent of the total of the
receiving company. Id. at 409. General Resolution No. 4 permits the reelection of foreigners to board
of directors so long as their participation on the board does not exceed the amount of foreign
ownership. Id. at 410-Il. Similarly, the resolution provided that their participation does not exceed
the amount of foreign ownership. Id. at 411. General Resolution No. 6 allows foreign investors to
purchase from other foreign investors no more than one percent of a company where foreign investors
already own 96 percent of the total capital. Id. at 411-12. General Resolution No. 7 permits foreign
investors with "inmigrado" status to participate in the administration and management of Mexican
enterprises provided that these investors are not tied to foreign economic centers of decision-making.
Id. at 412-13; see Hyde & Ramirez de la Corte, supra note 44, at 246.
General Resolution No. 8 clarifies the Commission's power to rule on new investment by for-
eigners who already have investments in Mexico. LEYES, supra, at 413-15; see Hyde & Ramirez de
la Corte, supra note 44, at 247. General Resolution No. 9 requires all trusts in which foreigners have
a specified interest to complete registration with the National Registry of Foreign Investments.
LEYES, supra, at 417-18. General Resolution No. 10 sets forth the procedure to be used by individual
investors in acquiring stocks on the stock exchange. Id. at 420-21. General Resolution No. II
prohibits foreign investors from acquiring 25 percent or more of the capital of a business through
acquisitions in other companies before and during the enactment of the EIL. Id. at 431-33.
General Resolution No. 12 declares that new establishments which are not authorized under Article
12 and 15 of the EI.L are null and void and will be closed pursuant to Article 14. Id. at 435-36.
General Resolution No. 13 facilitates the transmission of shares between foreign investors belonging
to the same interest group. Id. at 437. General Resolution No. 14 limits the amount of equity a foreign
investor may acquire in a given transaction. A foreigner may only receive three percent of the total
ownership in each transfer and no more than 30 percent in all transfers to foreigners from Mexican
businessmen in the same Mexican property. Similarly, the foreign investor may only acquire five
percent equity per transfer and no more than 49 percent equity in all transfers from other foreigners
selling Mexican property. Id. at 439. General Resolution No. 15 permits foreigners to relocate within
the same political subdivision of the Republic of Mexico if the foreign business increases less than 20
percent in physical size, personnel, and value. It also permits the relocation within a zone of relatively
low economic development. Id. at 440-41. General Resolution No. 16 defines "new fields of
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restrictions on Mexican businesses. 50 Recently, the Mexican Government encour-
aged the Commission to further liberalize exemption policies and to admit for-
eign investment on a more discretionary basis in response to changes in the world
and national economy.
5 1
In February 1984, the Mexican Government announced plans to provide case-
by-case exemptions for foreign investors in some 34 industries. 52 Among the
explanations given for the proposed increase in exemptions from the foreign
equity participation restrictions is the view, held by some members of the govern-
ment and the ruling Revolutionary Party, that foreign investment is necessary to
revitalize Mexico's faltering industrial sectors. 
53
The Mexican Government encouraged the Commission to further liberalize the
granting of exemptions because it realizes that the Commission must have greater
discretion if it is to accommodate variations in the international capital markets.
Mexico's need and desire to maintain foreign investment adequate for indus-
trialization in the face of downward worldwide economic trends requires con-
tinued flexible application of the FI.L.5 4 Thus, the government also announced
that it would permit additional foreign investment in existing enterprises if do-
mestic sources of investment were unavailable.
5
The impact of this announcement should not be overemphasized. The govern-
ment does not propose to modify the FI.L to increase the number of exemptions
economic activity and new lines of products" within the meaning of Article 13 of the F.IL. Id. at
443-45. Finally, the last resolution, General Resolution No. 17, prevents the use of an organization or
of communications outside Mexico to promote the sale of real estate located inside Mexico. Id. at
519-20.
50. See Kryzda, Joint Ventures and Technology Transfers, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 549,
553-55 (1980); Murphy, The Echeverrian Wall: Two Perspectives on Foreign Investment and Licens-
ing in Mexico, 17 TEX. J. INT'L L. 135, 138 (1982).
51. See Amor, La regulacion juridica de las inversiones extranjeras en Mexico, in AsPEc'ros
JURIDICOS DE LA PLANEACION EN MEXICO 427, 434-36 (Secretaria de Programacion y Presupuesto
pub. 1981).
52. Exemptions are offered "farm machinery, food processsing equipment, textile manufacturing
equipment, high-powered motors and generators, large turbines and turbocompressors, telecom-
munications, computers, pharmaceuticals, synthetic resins and plastics, photographic equipment,
advanced biotechnology and motorcycles." Meislin, Mexico Relaxes the Rules On Foreign
Ownership, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1984, at D7; see also Little Has Changed In Mexico's Message On
Foreign Investment, Bus. Latin Am., Feb. 29, 1984, at 65, 66 [hereinafter cited as Little Change].
53. The Mexican Government considered a fundamental change in the F.I.L. to be politically
unacceptable since such a change would generate political tension in the form of opposition from the
Revolutionary Party and the trade unions. Mexico: Investment- "Flexibility" but no change in law,
Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Mar. 2, 1984, at 4 [hereinafter cited as Investment "Flexibility"]; Meislin,
supra note 52, at Dll.
54. Little Change, supra note 52, at 66. The decision to loosen the application of the FI.L. is
intended to attract foreign capital to those sectors in which Mexico has been unable to attract
significant amounts of foreign capital on a minority ownership basis. Id.; see supra note 52 and
accompanying text.
55. Meislin, supra note 52, at DII.
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now available to the foreign investor. Nor does the announced policy necessarily
indicate a change in the case-by-case application of the current law. Instead, the
government has instructed the Commission to exercise greater discretion in inter-
preting the FI.L. as it now reads.5 6 The government's announcement merely
explains the unofficial policy that has been followed for some time.57 Moreover,
the announced policy will have no binding legal effect until the government
decides to incorporate it into a general resolution.58
III. NIGERIA
Like the Mexican government, the Nigerian Government has recently relaxed
its restrictive foreign investment policies in order to promote industrial develop-
ment. Nigeria's indigenization policy was initially shaped by the Nigerian Enter-
prises Promotion Decree enacted in 1972.19 To tighten these controls, the
government, in 1977, enacted a second Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree
(the NEPD). 6 Nevertheless, the government has been unable and, perhaps,
unwilling to actively deter the deliberate circumvention of the letter and the spirit
of the indigenization policy by foreign investors. To the extent that the Nigerian
Government acquiesces in such circumvention, it effectuates a de facto liberaliza-
tion of the restrictions in its foreign investment law.
61
By restricting foreign investment in the less technical and less capital intensive
businesses, the NEPD attempts to encourage and protect Nigerian participation in
those areas of the economy in which Nigerians are most competent, namely, the
56. See id.
57. See Investment "Flexibility,'" supra note 53, at 4.
58. Little Change, supra note 52, at 65.
59. Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree 1972, Decree No. 4, 1972 Annual Volume of the Laws
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria [Ann. Laws Nigeria], at A 11 (1973) [hereinafter cited as NEPD
1972]; see Megwa, Foreign Direct Investment Climate in Nigeria: The Changing Law and Develop-
ment Policies, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 487, 491 (1983).
60. Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 1977, Decree No. 3, 1977 Ann. Laws Nigeria, at A 17
[hereinafter cited as NEPD 1977]. One commentator describes the difference between the 1972 and
1977 laws this way: "The 1977 Decree tightened up what were described as 'loopholes' in the 1972
decree, reclassifying economic activities and reducing the equity share of transnational corporations
in most cases." Biersteker, The Illusion of State Power: Transnational Corporations and the Neu-
tralization of Host Country Legislation, 17 J. PEACE RESEARCH 207, 213 (1980).
61. Investigations conducted by a Nigerian newspaper "revealed that some top government offi-
cials were in the habit of rendering the decree impotent." Foreigners Criticized for By-passing the
Indigenisation Decree, Tribune, Aug. 29, 1979, at 11, reprinted in NIG. BULL. FOREIGN AFF., Aug.
1979, at 128. In addition, "various measures have been devised by alien investors, with the tacit
support or connivance of Nigerians or Nigerian officials, to ensure noncompliance with the ...
Indigenisation Decrees." Akinsanya, The State Strategies Toward Nigerian and Foreign Business in
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NIGERIA 179 (1. Zartman ed. 1983). For a list of the various means by which
foreign investors circumvent the NEPD, see infra note 68.
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non-industrial sectors of the economy.62 The NEPD primarily directs foreign
investment to those industries in which foreigners are allowed to own and control
40 to 60 percent of the total investment. 63 Industries in which foreign investors
62. One analyst explains:
While foreign investment was welcome in the specific area of manufacturing, there was also
the parallel expression of a resolute firmness to promote effective Nigerian participation in the
ownership and management of every industrial enterprise. One of the major objectives of the
"new" industrial policy was, therefore, to raise the proportion, on a nation-wide basis, of
indigenous ownership of industrial investment for the purpose of maximizing local retention
of profits, increasing net industrial contribution to the economy and avoiding unpleasant
socio-political consequences likely to arise in the future from foreign-absentee control of the
nation's industrial sector.
Akintola-Arikawe, Nigerian Indigenisation Policy and the Manufacturing Sector (With a Game
Frame-work for Evaluation), 24 NIG. J. ECON. & Soc. STUD. 61, 64 (1982). Consequently, the
foreign investment policy endeavors to enable Nigerian entrepeneurs "to develop their own expertise
and management skill, and to ensure active participation of Nigerians in those areas of economic
activity that are still under foreign control." Ezeife, Nigeria, in INDIGENIZATION OF AFRICAN
ECONOMIES 164, 166 (A. Adedeji ed. 1984).
A decline in foreign investment, however, did occur after the enactment of the NEPD 1972. One
author concluded:
Control [of foreign industrial enterprises] under the Indigenisation Decree has. . . resulted in
massive foreign capital disinvestment and capital repatriation, creates uncertainty and fear as
to future policies and attitudes towards foreign capital, slowed down the rate of industrial
growth, and increased the country's dependence on foreign suppliers of advanced
technologies.
Usoro, Nigerian Industrialisation Under "Self-Reliant" Growth Strategy: Some Lessons of History,
22 NIG. J. ECON. & Soc. STUD. 246, 249 (1980) (citation omitted). Another author explained:
[T]he unstable nature of the [investment] law fora period of five years [beginning in 1972], which
arose from the inordinate and random amendments culminating finally in the 1977 Act ...
affected the foreign business investor and therefore the economy of the country ...
• . . [Slince 1978, the country has experienced an exodus of foreign investors.
Tobi, Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 543, 553 (1981). The reason for
the decline in foreign investment was that the majority of foreign investors complying with the 1977
NEPD did so by divestment. Odife, The 1977 Budget and the Second Phase of Indigenization: A
Note, 18 NIG. J. ECON. & Soc. STUD. 451, 458 (1976). But see Foreign Investment in 1977 Up to
N1989.9 million, Bus. Times, June 17, 1980, reprinted in NIG. BULL. FOREIGN AFF., June 1980, at
123. According to the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board, some 993 alien enterprises were
affected by the NEPD 1977. 65 FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, OFFICIAL GAZETTE 673-705 (May
25, 1978).
63. According to the NEPD 1977, "'ownership' in relation to any enterprise includes any proprie-
tary interest in the enterprise beneficially, and any derivative of that word shall be construed accord-
ingly." NEPD 1977, supra note 60, at § 23(l)(c). In addition, section 23(2) provides that "[tihe
reference in this Decree to 'equity participation of Nigerian citizens or associations' is a reference to
stocks and shares which Nigerian citizens or associations have in such industry which do not bear a
fixed interest or dividend." Id. at § 23(2). Although case-by-case exemptions are not permitted under
the 1977 NEPD, the Commissioner of Industries may, with the prior approval of the Federal Executive
Council, a) reclassify enterprises listed in Schedules 1, 2 or 3 by addition, substitution, or deletion; b)
vary the percentages of equity participation of Nigerian citizens or associations in the enterprises
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may own up to 60 percent are relatively sophisticated and complex capital inten-
sive industries which require large inputs of high technology. 64 In the less tech-
nical areas of manufacturing and wholesaling, the NEPD limits foreign
investment to 40 percent of total investment. 65 Finally, in the smaller scale,
listed in schedules 2 and 3; and c) make special provisions for different enterprises and with respect to
different areas of the Federation, and "impose such terms as he may deem necessary." Id. at § 16.
The enterprises listed in Schedules 1, 2, and 3 when the NEPD 1977 was enacted are set forth infra in
notes 66, 65, and 64, respectively.
64. NEPD 1977, supra note 60, at § 6. The enterprises requiring 40 percent Nigerian ownership
under section 6 are listed in Schedule 3 of the NEPD 1977. This schedule includes the manufacture of:
tobacco; basic industrial minerals; synthetic materials; ceramics and structural clay products and
miscellaneous non-metallic mineral products; primary non-ferrous metal products; fabricated metal
instruments and products; engines and turbines; agricultrual machinery; metal and wood working
machinery; special industrial machinery; office, accounting and computing machinery; electrical
industrial machinery; radio, television and communication equipment; electrical appartus and sup-
plies not elsewhere classified; railway equipment; motor vehicles, motorcycles and aircraft; scientific
measuring and controlling equipment; photographic and optical goods; watches and clocks; and
textiles. Schedule 3 also includes the following services: distilling of spirits; ship building and
repairing; ocean shipping; storage and warehousing; maintenance of hotels, rooming houses, camps,
and lodging places; data processing and tabulating; production of cinema and television films; and the
rental of machinery and equipment. Finally, Schedule 3 includes all enterprises which are not public
sector enterprises and are not listed in Schedules I or 2. Id. at schedule 3; see EZEIFE, supra note 62,
at 170. Marketing in Int'l Trade Admin., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS
83-03, NIGERIA 27 (Apr. 1983); see also Bus. INT'L, NIGERIA: AFRICA'S ECONOMIC GIANT 54
(1979).
65. NEPD 1977, supra note 60, at § 5. Schedule 2 lists he enterprises which require 60 percent
Nigerian ownership. They include the manufacture of the following: basic iron and steel; beer; boats;
fertilizers; grain mill products; insecticides, pesticides and fungicides; bicycles; dry bakery products;
cement; cosmetics and perfumes; cocoa, chocolate, dairy products, and some food products; fur-
niture; metal household and office fixtures; leather footwear; matches; metal containers, paints and
varnishes, plastic products, rubber products, tires, soap and detergents, wire, nails, washers, bolts,
nuts, rivets, non-rubber and non-plastic products, sawn timber, plywood, veneers, and petro-chem-
ical feedstock. This second schedule also lists the following services: commercial, merchant and
development banking; bottling of soft drinks; business consulting and management services; fashion
designing; clearing and forwarding agencies; canning and preserving fruits and vegetables; coastal
and inland waterway shipping; construction; operation of department stores and supermarkets with
turnovers of more than two million naira; distribution machines and technical equipment; distribution
and servicing of motor vehicles, tractors, their spare parts and similar objects; fish and shrimp
trawling and processing; industrial cleaning; internal air transport; insurance; mining and quarrying;
oil milling; cotton ginning and crushing; paper conversion; plantation sugar processing; growing of
plantation tree crops, grains, and other cash crops; printing and publishing books, periodicals, and
other printed material; operation of restaurants, cafes, and other eating and drinking places; salt
refining and packaging; screen printing on cloth and dyeing; inland and coastal shipping; meat
processing, and leather finishing; wholesale distribution of imported goods; and photography. Id. at
schedule 2; see N. BALABKINS, INDIGENIZATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE NIGERIAN
EXPERIENCE, 195-97 (1982); Donovan, Nigerian After "Indigenization": Is There Any Room Left
For American Businessman? 8 INT'L LAW. 600, 601 (1974); Ezeife, supra note 62, at 169.
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relatively unsophisticated businesses, the NEPD prohibits all foreign participa-
tion. 66
Despite the government's desire to confine foreign investment to the industrial
sectors of the economy, however, the NEPD has decreased, rather than increased,
Nigerian control of the economy. 67 Many foreigners have found ways to circum-
vent the NEPD's foreign investment scheme. To escape the increased restrictions
on investment activities established in the NEPD, foreign investors have man-
aged, albeit sometimes illegally, to maintain majority. ownership or to obtain
control despite minority ownership in Nigerian companies. 68
Although the government has recently amended the NEPD to encourage com-
pliance, opportunities remain for the foreign investor to transgress the decree and
defeat its purpose. 69 The decree merely assigns Nigerians a percentage or equity
66. NEPD 1977, supra note 60, at § 4. Schedule 1 services requiring one hundred percent Nigerian
ownership pursuant to section 4 include: advertising and public relations; operation of lotteries;
assembly of radios, radiograms, record changers, television sets, tape recorders, and other electric
domestic appliances not combined with the manufacture of components; blending and bottling alco-
holic drinks; bread and cake making; operation of casino and gaming centres, cinemas, and other
places of entertainment; commercial transportation; commission agents; department stores and su-
premarkets with an annual turnover of less than two million naira; some distribution agencies; electric
repair shops not associated with the distribution of electrical goods; repair of watches, clocks and
jewelery; estate agency; film distribution; hairdressing; laundry and dry cleaning; representation of
manufacturers; operation of municipal bus and taxi services; newspaper printing and publishing;
office cleaning; poultry fanning; printing of stationery; radio and television broadcasting; retail trade;
rice milling; tire retreading; and wholesale distribution of local manufactures and other locally
produced goods. The first schedule also includes the manufacture blocks and ordinary tile, candles,
garments, jewellry, suitcases, brief cases, hand bags, purses, wallets, portfolios, shopping bags, and
singlets. Id. at schedule 1; see S. ScHArz, NIGERIAN CAPITALISM 59 (1977); Donovan, supra note 65,
at 601; Megwa, supra note 59, at 496. A frequent criticism of the list of businesses exclusively
reserved for Nigerians under Schedule I of the NEPD is that the businesses included were already
controlled by Nigerians before the adoption of the NEPD of 1972. id.
67. Biersteker, supra note 60, at 215.
68. Id. at 214. Foreign investors engage in both legal and illegal activities in order to circumvent
the NEPD. The technically legal means include: selling shares widely among many Nigerians;
arranging an agreement whereby the foreign investor maintains effective control over the manage-
ment of the enterprise; negotiating exemptions from or extensions for compliance with the decree;
technically creating two joint ventures (one of which permits a higher percentage of foreign
ownership), while the foreign partners exercise actual control over both; finding local partners and
managers who conform to the foreign investor's business interests and operating procedures; chang-
ing the voting rules to require more than a simple majority agreement to make certain decisions; and
dividing the board by selecting members from different ethnic groups and playing them off against
one another. Id. at 215-18. The illegal means are: adding extra expatriates to key positions without
obtaining work permits; bribing government officials; and partially complying with or ignoring the
indigenization requirenmts. Id. at 218-19.
69. In early 1981, the Nigerian Government reclassified ten enterprises into schedules permitting
higher levels of foreign ownership in an effort to attract businesses and deter smuggling in some of
them. After the reclassification, foreign investors were permitted to own up to 40 percent in busi-
nesses engaged in the manufacture of jewelery and related articles such as imitation jewelery and
watch repair, garment manufacture, and rice milling. All of these enterprises were previously reserved
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in enterprises without encouraging the skill or innovation necessary to stimulate
growth with decreased levels of foreign capital. 70 As a result, the NEPD restricts
foreign investment activities without promoting the growth of local businesses to
replace indigenized enterprises or discouraged foreign investment. Moreover, the
availability of unexploited, profitable business opportunities gives the foreign
investor additional incentive to continue to circumvent the NEPD.71
To the extent that the Nigerian Government is unable and unwilling to dis-
courage the activities of foreign investors that violate or neutralize the decree, the
government permits a liberalization of the NEPD's restrictions which affords
foreign investors greater flexibility in their investment activities. The non-com-
pliance of foreign investors with the NEPD permits foreigners to engage in
businesses in which the Nigerian Government has decided that Nigerian busi-
nessmen are competent to pursue alone or with the limited assistance of foreign
capital. Because of its inability and unwillingness to prevent foreign investors
from exploiting available investment opportunities, the Nigerian Government has
compromised its commitment to restricting foreign investment activities to indus-
trial sectors and to promoting growth in indigenized industries. 72
for Nigerians. In addition, the manufacture of metal containers, fertilizer production, cement man-
ufacture, sugar cane cultivation, and processing of plantation tree crops, grains, and other cash crops
were reclassified from a 40 percent to 60 percent limit on foreign investment. In tin smelting and
processing, however, the Government reduced the permissible amount of foreign ownership from 60
to 40 percent. Foreign Participation in Enterprises Widened, New Nigerian, Feb. 2, 1981, reprinted
in NIG. BULL. FOREIGN AFF., Feb. 1981, at 128. Section 16 of the NEPD 1977 authorizes the
Commissioner of Industries to reclassify enterprises. NEPD 1977, supra note 60, at § 16. These
reclassifications were consistent with the recently overthrown Shagari Goverment's policy of encour-
aging foreign investment. See Ogundipe, The hustle for foreign investment, reprinted in NiG. BULL.
FOREIGN AFF., Apr. 1981, at 142-44.
70. Cf S. SCHATZ, supra note 66, at 65-129 (asserting that there is no actual shortage of capital in
Nigeria, but that there is a shortage of viable business projects given the limited entrepreneurial skills
of Nigerians). The Nigerian Ministry of Industry has stated: "[Tihe test for successful indigenisation
is not how many companies or shares have changed hands in a given field of acitivity, but how many
new companies have been established since the existing ones were indigenized .... " Foreign Par-
ticipation in Enterprises Widened, New Nigerian, Feb. 4, 1981, reprinted in I NIG. BULL. FOREIGN
AFF., Feb. 1981, at 128-29.
71. See Biersteker, Indigenization in Nigeria: Renationalization or Denationalization?, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NIGERIA 185 (I. Zartman ed. 1983).
72. Ohiorhenuan, Multinational Corporations in the Nigerian Political Economy, 25 NIG. J.
ECON. & Soc. STUD. 155, 165-66 (1983). Ohiorhenuan observes:
In essence, the indigenization programme has achieved three things. First, it has locked
indigenous capital into a resource use pattern which derived initially from the private profit-
maximizing decisions of foreign capital, and is therefore not necessarily compatible from a
long run perspective, with the satisfaction of the basic social needs of the majority of
Nigerians. Second, the participation of multinational [i.e. foreign] capital has been shifted to
technical collaboration. This means that it will continue to appropriate part of the surplus,
while having a smaller stake in generating it since its share has now become a part of
production costs. Third, some proprietary and usufruct rights in industrial and commercial
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IV. CONCLUSION
The recent history of the foreign investment laws in Argentina, Mexico, and
Nigeria illustrates the relaxation of restrictive foreign investment laws through
new legislation, administrative delegation, broad exemption policies, or the sim-
ple failure to enforce existing laws. Regardless of the specific means used to
effectuate liberalization of investment restrictions, the results are similar. Despite
initial attempts to institute and maintain a certain degree of control over foreign
investment activities, foreign investors enjoy increasing flexibility under the laws
of these three countries.
The liberalization of foreign investment laws has had both positive and nega-
tive effects on industrialization in these developing nations. The effects are
positive to the extent that fewer restrictions encourage foreign investment in
profitable industries, thus providing resources and foreign currency that are
scarce in LDCs. Less government control over foreign investment, however, may
promote economic growth in a way that does not necessarily contribute signifi-
cantly to industrialization in the form desired.73 The ability to maintain a balance
between control over and encouragement of foreign investment is vital to the
struggle of developing countries for economic industrialization.
Foreign investment restrictions can contribute to industrialization to the degree
that they ensure that foreign investors refrain from investing in businesses in
which domestic technical skills and capital are sufficient. At the same time, such
restrictions must channel foreign investment into those sectors in which foreign
capital can foster growth and diversification. Even though foreign investors may
be willing to take advantage of business opportunities in developing countries,
they will remain hesitant to supply capital and technology in investment arrange-
ments that limit their ability to control their invested assets.7 4 Therefore, a
developing country may not receive the level of foreign investment desired in
industrial sectors as long as it maintains excessive control over foreign invest-
ment. A developing country which finds it cannot increase the level of foreign
investment in the industrial sectors will often seek to relax its restrictions as an
incentive to foreign investment. 75 The cases of Argentina, Mexico, and Nigeria
illustrate that the liberalization of foreign investment laws is often a direct re-
sponse to the economic necessity of attracting foreign investment vital to the
success of industrial policies.
property have been reassigned from the foreign capitalist to those Nigerians who, by virtue of
their previous position in the socio-economic hierarchy, had access to personal savings or
institutional credit.
Id.
73. See Akinsanya, supra note 1, at 773 ("The result of the capacity to attract substantial private
foreign investments is that the former colonial powers [of Africa] still dominated [direct foreign
investments] in these colonies. ... )
74. See Kalsi, supra note 2, at 581.
75. See supra note 3.
